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19th Century–Present

19th Century–Present: (The Militarization of Political Culture — Violence as an Extension of Political and Economic Strategy Dating to the Nineteenth Century…

African

19th Century–Present: (The Militarization of Political Culture — Violence as an Extension of Political and Economic Strategy Dating to the Nineteenth Century, Colonialism Temporarily Demilitarizing African Society While Creating Internal Pressures, Over Seventy Successful Military Coups Since 1957, West Africa’s Remarkable Record Including Dahomey’s Four Coups in the 1960s, the 1966 Coup Removing Nkrumah, Armies Initially Welcomed as Saviors Before Revealing Themselves as Ethnic and Self-Interested, and the Culture of the Coup as a Reassertion of African Military Power at the Heart of New Polities): One of the most striking features of postcolonial Africa has been the proliferation of violent conflict and the militarization of political culture. This was the outcome of particular postcolonial dynamics, but its roots ran deep — traceable to the nineteenth century when warfare became increasingly significant as an extension of political and economic strategy. The colonial period involved temporary demilitarization — Africans could not bear arms except in colonial service — but this created internal pressures that surfaced during decolonization. In pre-colonial societies, military and politics were closely intertwined, political leaders were often soldiers, armies followed particular local leaders rather than serving an abstract state, and the notion of an apolitical army was largely alien. By the early 1970s, a remarkable number of states had succumbed to military rule — over seventy successful seizures of power since 1957, with many more attempted. West Africa had a remarkable record: Dahomey suffered four coups in the 1960s with twelve governments and six constitutions between 1963 and 1969, while the 1966 Ghana coup removed Nkrumah himself. Initially, armies building on reputations for professionalism projected themselves as guardians free of corruption — Mobutu was hailed as a hero restoring order in the Congo, the Nigerian army held the country together through Biafra. But armies seized control for various reasons: military grievances over pay, ethnic tensions, and personal ambition of commanders. Armies recruited from marginal groups viewed military service as advancement, and the ethnic balance of inherited armies had important political consequences. Uganda under Amin — a northerner of the tiny Kakwa group — exemplified the extraordinarily brutal tyranny that could emerge.

Source HT-HMAP-0164, 0165