1994, January – April: (Clinton’s Temper Slips — Aristide’s Own Prospects Are Clouded, Aristide Calls for Revocation of the Refugee Repatriation Treaty and a…

1994, January – April: (Clinton’s Temper Slips — Aristide’s Own Prospects Are Clouded, Aristide Calls for Revocation of the Refugee Repatriation Treaty and a State Department Official Walks Out, Ambassador Swing Replaces Bourik Chaje, Rapes as a Weapon of Political Retribution — the Handiwork of Michel François Now Police Chief, Business Begins to Reassess — Aristide Will Have to Come Back and the Army Will Have to Change, the Army War College Scores the Administration for Vacillation, David Obey Calls for a U.S. Invasion, Three Years into a Five-Year Term and Aristide Suspects Washington Wants Him to Serve Out His Term in Exile, Aristide Gives Six-Month Notice on the Refugee Treaty, Randall Robinson’s Hunger Strike, Aristide Lambasts Washington’s Refugee Policy as a Cynical Joke and a Racist Policy, Six Congressmen Including Joseph P. Kennedy Arrested in a White House Sit-In, and William Gray Replaces Pezzullo as Point Man): Annoyance at Aristide’s intransigence carried over into 1994 — even President Clinton, normally careful to conceal what could be a strong temper, let slip that Aristide’s own prospects were clouded by what had happened with Malval. President Aristide had done nothing to mend fences with the Washington administration by calling at mid-month for the revocation of the agreement that gave the U.S. legal cover for its refugee repatriation — his call prompted a State Department representative to walk out in anger. Bourik chaje, never unladen, had been replaced as U.S. ambassador by a Clinton appointee, William Lacy Swing. In Haiti, emboldened by signs of disarray in the opposition camp, the junta turned up the heat — the morning harvest of bodies increased and, in a weapon calculated to outrage Haitian society, rapes as a weapon of political retribution. The campaign, with all its Duvalierist trademarks, was the handiwork of Michel François, who by now held the job of police chief in Port-au-Prince. The junta’s boldness masked a deteriorating situation — business, once strongly on the army’s side, had begun to reassess. The mood was summed up by one businessman who said it was clear what had to be done to get out of the crisis: Aristide would have to come back and the army was going to have to change. Everyone agreed this was the solution except the army and the macoutes. Even the Army War College, not normally known as a hotbed of liberalism, scored the U.S. administration for vacillation and confusing actions that had been interpreted in Haiti as indecisive — the sixty-page report went on to say that good intentions were not enough, that one must have clearly defined and realistic goals, the means of attaining them, and the will to persist. Less diplomatically, the head of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, David Obey, called for a U.S. invasion. Three years into a five-year term, Aristide and his advisers grew increasingly suspicious that Washington’s intent was to let him serve out his term in exile. Playing the one remaining card he had, Aristide gave the six-month termination notice required by the 1981 refugee treaty, accompanied by a well-crafted public relations campaign devised in consultation with his sagest advisors such as Casimir and Adrien, as well as the Black Caucus. In mid-April 1994, TransAfrica’s Randall Robinson launched a hunger strike in protest of administration policy. On April 20, eschewing niceties, President Aristide himself lambasted Washington’s refugee policy as a cynical joke, a racist policy, really a way to say they did not care — going further, he said that if Clinton had done just half what he promised, the situation would have been long since resolved. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott scrambled to do damage control — their statement did nothing to mollify six Democratic congressmen, including Joseph P. Kennedy, who allowed themselves to be arrested after staging a well-publicized sit-in in front of the White House. Stung by the barrage of criticism, President Clinton moved decisively — Lawrence Pezzullo, a veteran diplomat with excellent credentials, was replaced as point man on Haitian policy by William Gray, former Congressman and head of the United Negro College Fund.