1989, December – 1990, January: (Avril Plays the China Card: Previous Governments Had Skillfully Used Beijing vs.

1989, December – 1990, January: (Avril Plays the China Card: Previous Governments Had Skillfully Used Beijing vs. Taipei, Taiwan Bursting with Foreign Exchange, Avril Flies Across the Pacific Expecting $40 Million, Opposition Leaders Send a Mid-Air Telex to Taipei Declaring Any Agreement Non-Binding, the Chinese Welcome Befitting a Head of State but Behind Closed Doors the Going Is Tougher, Avril Presented with a Vague Promise Contingent on Democratic Elections, the Sour General Cancels His Press Conference and Returns Empty-Handed, the January 12 General Strike Fails, and the Christian Democratic Party Offices Smeared with Excrement the Night Before Avril’s Return): After nearly fourteen months in power, Prosper Avril had yet to succeed in restoring the flow of foreign aid to Haiti. Desperate, he sought to play Haiti’s China card — previous governments had skillfully used the rivalry between Beijing and Taipei to their advantage, Beijing having long regarded diplomatic recognition as a trophy, particularly before it had been accorded full U.S. recognition or a UN seat. Taiwan, eager to maintain embassies in as many countries as possible, was not slow in rewarding with development aid those who stood by Taipei. From a practical standpoint Taiwan was a good friend to have — bursting at the seams with foreign exchange, it also manufactured consumer goods of interest to smaller, undeveloped economies. By 1990, having stanched the flow of diplomatic deserters to Beijing, the Taipei government was far less keen to simply buy recognition outright. Into this situation, at the beginning of 1990, flew Prosper Avril. Preliminary signals had led Avril to believe that some forty million dollars in aid would result from his visit — the General promptly embarked on the long trip across the Pacific. Arriving jetlagged in a chilly Taipei, Avril was livid to discover that his arrival had been anticipated by a telex sent to the Taiwan government by opposition leaders while he was in mid-air, the gist being that any agreement reached would not be considered binding on the Haitian people. The Chinese put on a welcome befitting a head of state — treatment the General was delighted to receive — but behind closed doors the going was much tougher. Instead of an agreement with a specific amount or a wire transfer, he found himself presented with a vague promise of yet-to-be-defined aid, the quid pro quo being his signature on a joint declaration promising to hold democratic elections in Haiti. Confronted with a diplomatic fait accompli, the now sour Avril canceled a planned press conference and embarked, empty-handed, on the long trip home. Back in Port-au-Prince, the opposition had hoped to use Avril’s absence to gin up enough disturbances to prevent his return — a call for a general strike on January 12, 1990 failed, and just to underline how real the government’s power still was, the offices of the Christian Democratic Party and the most powerful union, CATH, were smeared with excrement the night before Avril’s return. The Taiwan debacle — a dictator flying halfway around the world for money, outmaneuvered in mid-flight by a telex from his own opposition, returning with nothing but a promise contingent on the very democratic elections his regime existed to prevent — measured the terminal absurdity of the Avril government: a military ruler so desperate for the foreign aid his predecessors had squandered that he was willing to sign a pledge of democratic intent in Taipei that he had no capacity to honor in Port-au-Prince, the promissory note of Haitian democracy now circulating as a negotiable instrument on the far side of the Pacific.