1916–1918: (Waller and Butler: The Man of War, the Gendarmerie Commandant, and the Veritable Menace): If Caperton and Beach had been men of address and conci…

1916–1918: (Waller and Butler: The Man of War, the Gendarmerie Commandant, and the Veritable Menace): If Caperton and Beach had been men of address and conciliation, Waller was a man of war — not a stereotype blockhead colonel but energetic, practical, quick-minded, resolute, and extremely firm, as well as blunt, outspoken, and no diplomat. The very qualities that enabled Waller, seconded by Cole and Butler, to subdue the North and the Artibonite in three months carried built-in defects insofar as the nuances of occupation and the Byzantine ways of Port-au-Prince were concerned. Waller’s lack of finesse particularly infuriated the Haitian politicians — Danache, their tribune, could barely restrain himself, calling Waller one who had never known common politeness, courtesy, or respect for people, a man who at home was certainly a professional lyncher of poor Negroes seduced into the American Army. To prove Waller’s brutality, Danache quoted from a letter in which the Marine supposedly told Dartiguenave that he knew the president corresponded in amenities while sending unfavorable reports to Washington, that this was what they called hypocrisy, that the president was president because the Americans were there, and that if he continued to undercut the colonel, Waller would recommend pulling troops out for just twenty-four hours — they would not be out of sight of La Gonâve before Dartiguenave was thrown out of the National Palace. As Gendarmerie commandant, Butler set much of the tone of early American contacts — his contempt for the elite was outspoken, while his feelings for the noir masses were affectionate but paternal, dividing the Haitian people into two classes: the one percent who wore shoes and the ninety-nine percent who did not, the latter being the most kindly, generous, hospitable, pleasure-loving people he had ever known, most gentle in their natural state, but capable of the most horrible atrocities when the other one percent in their long-toed shoes and celluloid collars stirred them up. After Waller was promoted and returned home in December 1916, Cole — more amiable and conciliatory than his predecessor — succeeded him, but Butler remained until March 1918, training the Gendarmerie and directing an intensive road-building effort that would later be associated with grave abuses. De la Batie’s verdict on Butler was mordant: an officer of splendid military qualities who had especially distinguished himself in China but had blundered by involving himself in politics — naive, self-assured, exceedingly optimistic, not speaking French, readily duped by the politicians, and in the present situation a veritable menace. Had it not been for World War I, which drew Waller, Butler, and eventually Cole out of Haiti, their tensions with the elite could well have led to some final rupture, perhaps bringing on outright U.S. military government — instead, in December 1917, Cole was relieved by Colonel John H. Russell, the quiet-spoken Georgian who, except for one brief interval, was destined to direct the American occupation for the next thirteen years.