1891, January–April 22: (Ti Malis Saves the Môle: Firmin, Douglass, and the Defeat of Gherardi’s Squadron): A recurring gambit in Haitian diplomacy had been …

1891, January–April 22: (Ti Malis Saves the Môle: Firmin, Douglass, and the Defeat of Gherardi’s Squadron): A recurring gambit in Haitian diplomacy had been to dangle naval-base rights at the Môle under the noses of foreign powers. In December 1888, Hyppolite had offered Consul Goutier commercial preferences and the use of Môle St. Nicolas as a coaling station in return for U.S. support, but then had second thoughts and asked Goutier not to repeat the conversation. The 1890s were a decade of imperialism, and with James G. Blaine at State, U.S. foreign policy took an expansionist turn toward Cuba and Haiti. On January 25, 1891, Admiral Gherardi brought his flagship U.S.S. Philadelphia plus Kearsarge and Enterprise to Port-au-Prince and sent for Douglass to come aboard — Douglass well knew that had he been white, Gherardi would have come ashore and called on him. On New Year’s Day Douglass had broached the subject with Firmin, finding no Haitian eagerness, and reminded Washington that there was perhaps no point upon which the people of Haiti were more sensitive and united than any question touching cession of territory. On April 28 at the palace, Gherardi stated the case with force, reminding Hyppolite of services rendered, and the president conditionally agreed the executive would grant the lease subject to ratification by the legislative chambers. But when Firmin examined Gherardi’s credentials on February 16, he blandly noted the admiral’s special commission was signed only by the Secretary of the Navy, not the President — and while Gherardi chafed and held gunnery exercises off Iroquois Reef to loosen up negotiations, Hyppolite left town on an extensive southern tour. On April 18, four more warships — Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, and Yorktown — steamed in to reinforce Gherardi. On April 22, Firmin replied: the answer was no. Haiti’s constitution precluded any such alienation of sovereignty, and Haiti would not negotiate under the guns of seven foreign warships. Firmin’s confidence was not clairvoyance: French Foreign Minister Ribot had sent a confidential telegram revealing that Blaine had spontaneously told the French minister in Washington that the U.S. government would not use force against Haiti. Within forty-eight hours the U.S. squadron had its anchors up. In terms of Haitian folklore, the Ti Malis diplomacy of Port-au-Prince had outmaneuvered ponderous Bouki from Washington — without compromising an inch of Haitian soil, Hyppolite and Firmin had skillfully spiked the guns of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.